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Abstract
Carneades is an open source argument mapping application and a programming
library for building argumentation support tools. In this paper, Carneades’ support
for argument reconstruction, evaluation and visualization is illustrated by modeling
most of the factual and legal arguments in Popov v Hayashi.1
1 Introduction
Carneades is an open source argument mapping application and a programming li-
brary for building argumentation support tools.2 Carneades is based on a formal, com-
putational model [Gordon et al., 2007] of Walton’s theory of argument structure and
evaluation [Walton, 2006] and is designed to support a variety of argumentation tasks,
illustrated in Figure 1.
In this paper we want to focus on just two of these tasks, by using Carneades to
reconstruct and critically evaluate Judge McCarthy’s arguments in his decision of the
Popov v Hayashi case, similar to the way we have used Carneades previously to model
Pierson v Post [Gordon and Walton, 2006].
Our methodology for reconstructing and evaluating arguments using Carneades,
which we also used in our reconstruction of Pierson v Post, can be summarized as
follows:
1. Make a list of all of the atomic propositions in the arguments. We use the term
“statement” as a synonym for “atomic proposition”.
2. Assign each statement in the list an identifier, or key, to make it easy to refer to
them later, creating a key list.
1The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com
2http://carneades.github.com
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Figure 1: Argumentation Uses Cases
3. Identify the premises and conclusion of each argument, where each premise and
conclusion is a statement in the key list.
4. A premise of one argument may be the conclusion of another. Use the Carneades
mapping tool to create an argument diagram, by linking the shared statements of
the arguments.
5. Assign a proof standard, such as “beyond a reasonable doubt”, to each statement
in the graph.
6. Label each argument with the argumentation scheme used to construct the argu-
ment.
7. From the perspective of the audience of interest, in this example Judge Mc-
Carthy, label the statements which have been accepted as true, or rejected as
false, by the audience, without argument. These accepted and rejected state-
ments are assumptions of the audience.
8. Starting with the leaves of the argument graph, use the arguments to reason for-
wards from the accepted and rejected statements, noting which arguments are
applicable, because all of their premises hold, and which statements are accept-
able, because the applicable arguments satisfy the statement’s proof standard,
as assigned previously. This step is performed automatically by the Carneades
software.
9. Critically evaluate the arguments by checking which conclusions are acceptable
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given the arguments and by using the argumentation schemes to reveal and criti-
cally question any implicit premises.
The methodology is flexible. It does not require these steps to be performed in
a strictly linear order. Rather, one can work in more iterative fashion, moving back
and forth between these tasks as needed. For example, one could start out by model-
ing a single argument and its statements, adding further statements to the key list as
necessary for modeling the remaining arguments.
In the next section, we apply the methodology sketched above to reconstruct and
evaluate Judge McCarthy’s arguments in his decision of Popov v Hayashi. The final
section of the paper reflects on the utility of our methodology and tools and compares
them to related prior work on modeling legal cases from the field of Artificial Intel-
ligence and Law and other methods and tools for mapping and evaluating arguments,
from the field of computational models of argument.
2 A Reconstruction of Popov v Hayashi
We assume the facts of Popov v Hayashi have been thoroughly presented elsewhere
in this volume and will present only a brief summary here. The plaintiff, Alex Popov,
and defendant, Patrick Hayashi, both attended as spectators a baseball game at PacBell
Park in San Franciso on October 7, 2001. During the game, Barry Bonds, playing for
the San Francisco Giants, hit his seventy third home run, breaking the previous record.
The ball was hit into the stands of the arcade section, where Popov, Hayashi and many
other fans had positioned themselves, armed with baseball gloves, hoping for just this
event and a chance to catch the ball. Popov jumped to catch the ball and had it in his
glove but was attacked by a crowd before he could gain complete control of the ball.
The ball fell out of Popov’s glove and rolled to a place where Hayashi was able to pick
it up and put it in his pocket. Hayashi was not a member of the crowd which attacked
Popov. Presuming the ball to be very valuable, Popov sued Hayashi, pleading causes
of action for conversion and trespass to chattel.
The case was decided in the first instance by Judge Kevin M. McCarthy, for the
Superior Court of California in San Francisco. The published opinion of the court
has two main sections, presenting first an analysis of the facts found on the basis of
the evidence brought before the court, followed by an analysis of the legal issues. It
appears that the factual issues were decided by Judge McCarthy, not a jury.
Let us begin with the factual issues. There were two main factual issues in the
Popov case: 1) Did Popov catch the ball? And 2) Was Hayashi guilty of any wrong-
doing? In particular was Hayashi one of the persons who attacked Popov and pre-
vented him from having a chance to complete his catch of the ball? To illustrate how
Carneades can be used as a case management tool for mapping out and evaluating
evidence, serving the same purpose as Wigmore diagrams [Wigmore, 1908, Gordon,
2007], it is sufficient to model the evidence for the first factual issue, as shown in
Figure 2.
As shown in the figure, Popov submitted the following evidence to prove that he
caught the ball: 1) A video taken by Josh Keppel, a cameraman positioned near the
3
✔ ✔
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Figure 2: Would Popov have caught the ball?
arcade where Popov tried to catch the ball, and 2) the testimony of 17 witnesses. This
evidence is modeled as two arguments pro Popov’s claim that he caught the ball. The
statement label with the key “Keppel’s Video”, is intended to mean “Keppel’s video
shows that Popov caught the ball.” The burden of proof in civil cases is preponderance
of the evidence. In the model, each piece of evidence has been given the default weight
of 0.5, on a scale from 0.0 to 1.0, similar to probability theory.3 The basic procedure
for resolving factual issues is to aggregate the weights of the evidence pro and con the
fact at issue. Interestingly, in this case no evidence was brought forward to show that
Popov did not catch the ball. Thus there are no arguments con this issue in the model.
But Popov failed to meet the preponderance of the evidence proof standard nonethe-
less. This is because arguments were brought forward which undermined this evidence.
While the video did show that Popov’s glove stopped the trajectory of the ball, it did
not show that the ball was secure. Thus Judge McCarthy decided the video did not
show that Popov had caught the ball. Similarly, the testimony of the 17 witnesses was
rejected as evidence tending to show that Popov caught the ball, for several reasons:
some of the testimony was inconsistent, some of the witnesses were shown to be bi-
ased, some of the witnesses did not have a good vantage point and thus were not able
to clearly observe the events, and some of the witnesses testified that they could not
remember what happened, or at least not well. Popov’s claim that he caught the ball is
left with no supporting evidence as a result. Judge McCarthy did not reject this claim,
as being false, but simply left this issue open, i.e. undecided. In the diagrams, un-
decided statements are shown with white background; accepted statements are shown
with a gray background, together with a check mark in the lower left corner of the box;
and rejected statements are also shown with a gray background, but with an X in the
lower left corner of the box. Since Popov, as the plaintiff, has the burden of proving all
facts necessary to establish the elements of the causes of action he has pled, his failure
to prove that he caught the ball will turn out, as we will see below, to be fatal for his
legal claim that Hayashi converted the ball.
3Weights do not play a role in the legal arguments modeled below, since the proof standard used to resolve
legal issues is dialectical validity, where weights are irrelevant.
4
We have modeled the counterarguments in two different ways, with a con argu-
ment rebutting the video evidence and by using critical questions of the argumentation
scheme for witness testimony. [Walton, 2005, p. 13] listed the following critical ques-
tions for arguments from witness testimony:
1. Is what the witness said internally consistent?
2. Is what the witness said consistent with the known facts of the case?
3. Is what the witness said consistent with what other witnesses said?
4. Is there some kind of bias that can be attributed to the account given by the
witness?
5. How plausible is the statement asserted by the witness?
In Carneades, critical questions are modeled as special types of premises, called
exceptions and assumptions [Gordon et al., 2007]. Whether an exception or an as-
sumption is appropriate depends on which party has the burden of proof for the state-
ment once the question has been asked. For example, if the person who asked the bias
question has the burden of proving the witness was in fact biased, then the bias ques-
tion should be modeled as an exception. In our model of Popov v Hayashi we have
assumed that all of these questions should be modeled as exceptions. Although it is not
clear from the opinion whether Hayashi had the burden of proof for these questions, it
is clear that Judge McCarthy decided that these questions were to be answered affirma-
tively. He found that the witnesses were in fact biased, inconsistent, etc. Had Popov
had the burden of proof for these questions, we could have modeled them as assump-
tions which had been called into question. Then Popov would have had to prove that
the witnesses were not biased, inconsistent, and so on. The testimonial evidence would
have failed had Popov not met this burden of proof, without Judge McCarthy having to
find, for example, that the witnesses were biased. Finally, notice that we have modeled
the memory and vantage point counterarguments also as exceptions, even though these
were not included in the list of critical questions in Walton’s formulation of the scheme
for arguments from witness testimony. Schemes provide guidance, helping people to
ask relevant critical questions. This does not mean they are exhaustive. Other critical
questions may also be relevant, depending on the situation.
Let us now turn to the legal issues. Judge McCarthy’s analysis of the legal issues
can be summarized as follows. The elements of the conversion and trespass to chattel
were first presented. The trespass to chattel claim was easily dismissed, since Hayashi
did not damage the ball. The conversion cause of action has two elements, ownership
of the ball by Popov and the wrongful exercise of control (“dominion”) over the ball by
Hayashi. The precedent cases show two ways Popov could be found to own the ball,
by having title or by having possession. He didn’t have title, which left possession to
check. Since Popov did not have complete control of the ball, having dropped it during
the attack by the crowd, the Pierson v Post line of cases is relevant here, since in some of
these cases possession was found even though the party did not have complete control
of the property. But Judge McCarthy distinguished the facts of the Popov case from
these precedents, by arguing that the concept of possession is contextual and depends
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on the customs and conventions of the field or industry. Hunting and fishing have
different customs than baseball. Possession in baseball, by custom, requires complete
control of the ball. Popov had the burden of proving, with a preponderance of the
evidence, that he had complete control, but failed to meet this burden of proof. But
since Popov was prevented from trying to complete his catch of the ball by the attack
of the crowd, Judge McCarthy was not happy to leave it at that. Using an argument from
practical reasoning, i.e. a policy argument, with the aim of discouraging such violence
at baseball games, Judge McCarthy created a rule stating a person has a qualified right
to possession of an abandoned piece of property when he has taken sufficient steps to
achieve possession which were interrupted by unlawful acts of others. Nonetheless,
despite now having argued that Popov did have a sufficient ownership interest in the
ball to sustain a cause of action for conversion, the conversion claim failed, because
its second requirement, namely the wrongful exercise of dominion over the ball by
Hayashi, was found to not be satisfied. Not only did Popov fail to prove that Hayashi
had done anything wrong, but the court found, on the contrary, that Hayashi had done
nothing wrong and was “a victim of the same bandits that attacked Mr. Popov.”. 4
Having proven neither of his two claims, conversion or trespass, one might think
that Popov would have lost the case and gone home empty handed. But in Common
Law jurisdictions, at least, judges have both the obligation and the power to reach a fair,
equitable decision, balancing the interests of the parties, in particular when, as in this
case, an application of the existing legal rules alone would fail to lead to an equitable
result. This is a practical problem, where alternative possible courses of action are
compared to see which alternative best promotes the value of equity. Judge McCarthy
considered three alternatives: 1) giving the ball to Popov, 2) giving the ball to Hayashi,
and 3) selling the ball and dividing the proceeds equally between Popov and Hayashi.
Giving the ball to Popov would not have been fair to Hayashi, who did nothing wrong
and had gained complete control and possesion of the ball while Popov was not able
to prove that he, Popov, had caught the ball. Giving the ball to Hayashi would not
be fair to Popov, who had acquired a qualified right to possess the ball, because his
attempt to catch the ball was interrupted by the illegal attack of the crowd. Judge
McCarthy concluded that the claims of Popov and Hayashi to the ball were of equal
quality, making a 50/50 division of the proceeds from the sale of the ball the only fair
alternative.
In the rest of this section, McCarthy’s main legal arguments will be modeled using
Carneades. We will then use this model to try to evaluate his arguments and reveal
some potential weaknesses. Let’s begin with the two causes of action, conversion and
trespass to chattel, shown in Figure 3.
The statement at the top of this figure is intended to mean something like “The
plaintiff, Popov, has proven the elements of a cause of action against Hayashi which
entitles him to the requested relief as a matter of law.” The line around the box just
4Incidentally, this finding renders Judge McCarthy’s proposed rule about a qualified right to possession
being sufficient to meet the ownership requirement of the conversion cause of action obiter dictum, not
relevant for the decision of the case and thus not binding precedent. According to Black [1979], obiter
dictum is “an observation or remark made by a judge when pronouncing an opinion on a case, concerning
some rule, principal or application of law, or the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but not
necessarily involved in the case or essential for its determination.”
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Figure 3: The Causes of Action
indicates that it has been selected and is the focus of our attention. The two causes
of action claimed by Popov are modeled as arguments pro this top statement, each
with a single premise naming the cause of action. The conversion cause of action is
supported by an argument with three premises, a major premise stating a rule and two
minor premises stating that the conditions of this rule are satisfied by the facts of this
case. The major premise is intended to mean “Conversion is the wrongful exercise
of dominion over the personal property of another.”. The two minor premises in the
figure are intended to mean “The ball is the personal property of Popov.” and “Hayashi
wrongfully exercised dominion over the ball.”.
Similarly, arguments are included in the diagram for two kinds of trespasses to
chattel. The first argument states, in its major premise, that “Interference with the use
of personal property is trespass to chattel.” and, in a minor premise, that “Hayashi in-
terferred with Popov’s use of the ball.” Another minor premise, stating that the ball is
the personal property of Popov, has been left implicit in this argument, as in Judge Mc-
Carthy’s expression of this argument in his opinion. We are only trying to reconstruct
Judge McCarthy’s arguments at this point, not trying to evaluate them by asking critical
questions that he did not ask. The second argument for trespass to chattel also has two
premises, a major premise stating that damaging personal property is trespass to chattel
and a minor premise stating that Hayashi damaged the ball. Here too the minor premise
stating that the ball was Popov’s personal property has been left implicit. Both of these
trespass to chattel arguments were dismissed summarily by Judge McCarthy, by not-
ing that the plaintiff, Popov, had failed to claim, let alone prove, the minor premises:
“In the case at bar, Mr. Popov is not claiming that Mr. Hayashi damaged the ball or
that he interfered with Mr. Popov’s enjoyment of the ball. He claims instead that Mr.
Hayashi intentionally took it from him and refused to give it back. This is not trespass
to chattel.” So he immediately shifted his focus to the conversion cause of action.
In the model, we didn’t reject the minor premises of the trespass to chattel argu-
ments as being false. Since Popov had the burden of proof for these facts, Judge Mc-
Carthy didn’t need to reject them in order for the trespass to chattel claim to fail. Had
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the premises been rejected, they would have been displayed with a gray background
together with an X in the lower lefthand corner. The white background indicates they
are at issue and have been neither accepted nor rejected.
In analyzing the conversion argument, Judge McCarthy first supported its major
premise, the rule, by citing a legal treatise, Witkin’s Summary of California Law
[1990], and a single case, Fresno Air Service v Wood5. In Toulmin’s terms [Toulmin,
1958], the major premise expresses the warrant of the argument and these citations
provide backing for the warrant. In Carneades, backing is modeled using further argu-
ments, pro the major premise, as shown in Figure 4.
The premises of these arguments are shown with a gray background, together with
a check mark, since they have been accepted by Judge McCarthy. The accepted and
rejected statements are input to the Carneades system. They represent the assumptions
of the person or persons, called the audience, from whose perspective the arguments
are being evaluated, in this case Judge McCarthy. The upper “traffic light” to the right
of the conclusion, stating the rule that conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion
over the personal property of another, is filled with gray to indicate that this conclusion
is acceptable given these arguments. The acceptability of a statement and its logical
complement (negation) are computed by Carneades and visualized with the two traf-
fic lights. The top light shows the acceptability of the statement and the bottom light
shows the acceptability of its complement. Acceptability is computed using the proof
standard assigned to a statement, in this case dialectical validity. The dialectical valid-
ity standard is satisfied if there is at least one applicable argument pro the statement and
no arguments con the statement are applicable. An argument is applicable only if all of
its premises have been accepted or, if the statement is still undecided, acceptable. The
rule is shown with a gray background together with a check mark, indicating that it has
was accepted by Judge McCarthy. Had the statement not been acceptable, this decision
would not have been justified by the arguments. For example, Judge McCarthy’s de-
cision to accept Fresno Air Service v Wood as backing for the rule was not supported
by further arguments and thus lacks justification. However this lack of justification
does not necessarily indicate a weakness in his argument. If Judge McCarthy’s inter-
pretation of Fresno Air Service v Wood is uncontroversial it probably does not require
justification in order for his analysis of the Popov case to be persuasive.
Judge McCarthy addressed next the issue of whether or not the ball was Popov’s
personal property, which is one of the conditions of the conversion cause of action and
thus also one of the minor premises of the conversion argument. It is interesting that
Judge McCarthy chose to address this minor premise first, since as we will see it re-
quires a rather involved analysis to resolve, rather than the other minor premise, about
Hayashi having wrongfully exercised dominion over the ball. Judge McCarthy found
that Hayashi “committed no wrongful act”. On the contrary, Hayashi was found to be
“a victim of the same bandits that attacked Popov”. In footnote 5 of the opinion there
is some discussion of the evidence of wrongdoing by Hayashi, including a video tape
purportedly showing Hayashi to be biting the leg of someone and some witness testi-
mony, but Judge McCarthy concluded the evidence was unconvincing and insufficient.
Had Judge McCarthy addressed this issue first in his opinion, he could have omitted
5Fresno Air Service v Wood, (1965) 232 Cal. App. 2d 801, 806
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Figure 4: Backing of the Conversion Warrant
his lengthy discussion of the ownership issue as not being relevant. But, as we will see,
his main conclusion of this analysis, that Popov had a qualified right to possession of
the ball sufficient to meet the ownership condition of the conversion cause of action,
was also important for his equity arguments later in the opinion.
Again, Judge McCarthy’s analysis of the ownership issue is rather involved and the
most detailed part of his opinion. He begins by first identifying three means of proving
ownership: “Conversion does not exist, however, unless the baseball rightfully belongs
to Mr. Popov. One who has neither title nor possession, nor any right to possession,
cannot sue for conversion.” Once again he backs this rule by citing Witkin [1990] and
a case, this time Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v San Francisco Bank.6 These
alternative arguments are shown in Figure 5. Their major premises (rules) and the
arguments backing these rules, by citing the above authorities, have been left implicit
to save space.
Figure 5: Ownership of the Ball
The title argument is not pursued further by Judge McCarthy, presumably because
Popov did not claim to have title to the ball, but rather only possession. Interestingly,
to help him resolve the possession issue, Judge McCarthy requested the advice of four
“distinguished law professors”. Not surprisingly, perhaps, these professors could not
6Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v San Francisco Bank. (1943) 58 Cal. App. 2d 528, 534
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agree on a definition of possession. Professor Bernhardt and Professor Brown argue
that possession requires physical control of the property and the subjective intent to
control the property. But Professor Bernhardt, in agreement with Professor Finkel-
mann, points out that physical control is a guideline, not a hard condition, which has
been softened by a line of precedent cases, including Pierson v Post7 and Young v
Hutchinson8. Based on an analysis of these precedents, Bernhardt and Finkelmann
proposed a rule stating that possession has been achieved if “the actor is actively and
ably engaged in efforts to establish complete control” and “such efforts are reasonably
calculated to result in unequivocal dominion and control at some point in the near fu-
ture”. Professor Gray argued for a stricter rule in this case, based on custom in baseball
and more in line with the general rule requiring physical control, in which a “ball is
caught if the person has achieved complete control of the ball at the point in time when
the momentum of the ball and the momentum of the fan trying to catch the ball ceases.”
Judge McCarthy distinguished Pierson v Post and the other “fish and animal” cases by
arguing that rules of possession are “contextual in nature” and “influenced by the cus-
tom and practice of the industry”. He followed Prof. Gray’s opinion regarding the
custom and practice in baseball and decided that the evidence submitted by Popov was
insufficient to prove that he had achieved full control of the ball by the preponderance
of evidence proof standard.
✔
✔
✔ ✔
✔
✘ ✘
Figure 6: Possession of the Ball
The arguments about the possession issue are modeled, in somewhat simplified
form, as shown in Figure 6. We’ve modeled Judge McCarthy’s argument distinguish-
ing Popov from the animal cases as a con argument undercutting the rule proposed by
7Pierson v Post, 3 Caines R. (N.Y. 1805)
8Young v Hutchinson, 6 Q.B. 606 (1844)
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Professor Bernhardt and Professor Finkelmann, based on their analysis of the animal
cases. Notice how undercutters are modeled in Carneades as arguments against the
major premise of an argument, or the applicability of the major premise to the cur-
rent case, whose propositional content of the major premise expresses the rule applied
in the argument. That is, undercutters are modeled as premise attacks. (To be clear,
not all premise attacks model undercutters.) In the argument undercut, only the major
premise, for the proposed rule about reasonable efforts to gain control which are likely
to be successful in the near future being sufficient to establish possession, is shown in
the figure. Since this rule was rejected in this case, the minor premises are irrelevant.
The “expert analysis of animal cases” argument could be expanded into a more com-
plex argument which makes the case-based analysis of the animal cases of Professors
Bernhardt and Finkelmann’s explicit, but since Judge McCarthy distinguished Popov
from this line of cases the details are not necessary for understanding his decision. As
before, statements which have been accepted by Judge McCarthy are shown with gray
backgrounds together with a check mark in the lower lefthand corner. Figure 6 also il-
lustrates for the first time some rejected statements, shown with gray backgrounds and
an X in the lower lefthand corner. When all the premises of an argument hold, i.e. are
either accepted or, if at issue, acceptable, the argument is applicable. In the diagrams,
arguments are displayed as circles. If an argument is applicable, its circle is filled with
gray. Inapplicable arguments are shown with a white background. Again, the applica-
bility of arguments and the acceptability of statements are computed by the Carneades
system. Judge McCarthy’s decision to reject the proposed “reasonable and likely ef-
fective effort” rule for possession, proposed by Professors Bernhard and Finkelmann,
is (formally) justified, as indicated by the filled bottom traffic light to the right of the
rule, since it is supported by an applicable con argument.
The evaluation of Popov’s conversion claim is not over with the decision to reject
the claim of possession. Recall, as shown in Figure 5, that Judge McCarthy identified
three ways to prove ownership of the ball sufficient to sustain the conversion cause of
action: title, possession and a right to possession. Up until now the first two alter-
natives have been dispensed with. Judge McCarthy turned his attention to the third
possibility next by asking whether Popov had acquired a right to possession in the ball.
Using practical reasoning, Judge McCarthy concluded that Popov had acquired such
a right. The model in Carneades of this argument is shown in Figure 7. The full rule
adopted by Judge McCarthy is “When an actor takes significant but incomplete steps to
achieve possession of a piece of abandoned property and the effort is interrupted by the
unlawful acts of others, the actor has a legally cognizable pre-possessory interest in the
property ... which can support a cause of action for conversion.” The rule is shown in
an abbreviated form in the figure. Judge McCarthy supported this rule with two argu-
ments from practical reasoning. The first, shown in the diagram, is that the rule would
achieve the goal of inhibiting such attacks by mobs at baseball games, which would
promote the value of security. (See Atkinson et al. [2005] for an in-depth discussion
of the argumentation scheme for practical reasoning we are using here.) The second
argument from practical reasoning, not shown, is that this rule promotes fundamental
fairness.
One of the critical questions one can ask to challenge arguments from practical
reasoning is whether some other actions are available for achieving the same goals, or
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promoting the same values. In a footnote of his opinion, Judge McCarthy responded to
a critical question of this kind by Professor Gray, who suggested that such attacks could
be inhibited by suing the attackers for damages. But Judge McCarthy countered this
argument by pointing out that it would be impractical to prove which of the persons in
the crowd participated in the attack. Plaintiffs in such cases would usually not be able
to meet their burden of proof. Thus this alternative would not achieve the goal of in-
hibiting violence as effectively as Judge McCarthy’s proposed rule. To save space, and
also because they are not necessary to illustrate features of Carneades, these arguments
have not been included in the model.
Also not illustrated is Judge McCarthy’s justification for resorting to practical rea-
soning in this case. We use the term “resorting” because typically judges are wary of
using practical reasoning, since it raises controversial issues about the separation of
powers between the judiciary and legislature. While typically judges are supposed to
apply the (positive) law enacted by the legislature, not make policy decisions or enact
laws, judges in Common Law countries (at least) have long had the power, and perhaps
the responsibility, to do justice and decide cases in a fair way which promotes equity.
It is not clear to us whether this power extends to cases where an equitable solution
would be inconsistent with applicable legislation, but Judge McCarthy did not address
this issue, and presumably did not need to address this issue, since there is no indica-
tion that the rule he adopted was inconsistent with applicable legislation. Rather, his
rule appears to fill a gap in the legislation.
As shown in the figure, not only did Judge McCarthy accept his proposed rule, but
he also decided that all of its conditions were met by the facts of the case. Popov did
make a sufficient effort to try to catch the ball which was interrupted illegally by the
attacks of the mob. The evidence supporting these factual findings are not shown in the
diagram but are presented in the written opinion. Judge McCarthy did not try to justify
his claim that attacks of this kind are illegal, presumably because the law is clear and
uncontroversial on this point.
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
✔✔✔
✔
Figure 7: Popov’s Right to Possession of the Ball
Somewhat surprisingly, after going to all the trouble to construct a new rule giving
Popov an ownership interest in the ball sufficient to sustain the conversion cause of
action, Judge McCarthy next summarily dismissed the conversion claim by deciding
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that Popov had failed to prove, with a preponderance of the evidence, that Hayashi had
wrongfully “exercised dominion” over the ball. Recall that such a wrongful exercise
of control over the personal property is a further requirement of conversion, as shown
in Figure 3. On the contrary, Judge McCarthy decided that Hayashi had done nothing
wrong and was also a victim of the attacks of the crowd. Since Popov, the plaintiff,
failed to prove either of his claims, one might think that Judge McCarthy would end his
opinion at this point and declare Hayashi the winner of the case. The plaintiff has the
burden of proof. The parties are not in symmetric positions. The defendant, Hayashi,
did not need to prove that he had a right to possess and keep the ball. He only needed
to produce arguments and evidence sufficient to prevent Popov from proving his case.
And Hayashi succeeded in meeting this goal fully. Nonetheless, Judge McCarthy was
not content to stop here, but went on to consider alternative solutions to the problem of
how to achieve a fair result in this case. Our model of his arguments in Carneades are
shown in Figure 8.
✘ ✘
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
✔✔✔✔
✔
Figure 8: Trying to Find an Equitable Solution
We have modeled this part of Judge McCarthy’s opinion as a deliberation problem,
in the style of issue-based information systems [Rittel and Webber, 1973]. Many argu-
ment mapping tools have been based on the IBIS model [Conklin and Begeman, 1988,
Gordon and Karacapilidis, 1997, Selvin et al., 2001]. The basic building blocks of the
IBIS model are issues, positions and pro and con arguments. Issues represent a problem
to be solved. For example, the problem of Judge McCarthy is trying to solve is how to
decide the Popov case in an equitable way. In Figure 8, we’ve represented this problem
as a question, which is intended to mean something like “Does an equitable solution
exist in this case?”. Strictly speaking, the formal model underlying Carneades does not
support questions, but only declarative sentences, called statements. Nonetheless, such
questions can be given a declarative interpretation in first-order logic, using existential
quantifiers. That is, we interpret this question to mean the statement “There exists an
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equitable solution in this case.” Positions in the IBIS model of deliberation are the
proposed alternative solutions to the problem. In Carneades positions are represented
as alternative pro arguments for the statement at issue. For resolving the equity issue,
Judge McCarthy considered three alternatives: 1) giving the ball to Popov, 2) giving
the ball to Hayashi, and 3) selling the ball and dividing the proceeds equally between
Popov and Hayashi. The final element of the IBIS model, pro and con arguments, are
directly supported by Carneades. Judge McCarthy’s argument con the first alternative,
giving the ball to Popov, is that since Popov did not prove that he caught the ball, giving
the ball to him would be unfair to Hayashi. Judge McCarthy’s argument con the second
alternative, giving the ball to Hayashi, is that the since Hayashi’s ownership of the ball
was encumbered by Popov’s prepossessory interest in the ball, analogous to a “cloud”
on a title to real property, giving Hayashi the ball would be unfair to Popov. The final
alternative considered, selling the ball and dividing the proceeds equally, was the fairest
alternative in Judge McCarthy’s opinion. Since Popov and Hayashi had equally good
claims to the ball, it seems fair that they should be awarded equal amounts. This basic
equity argument seems rather obvious and intuitive. In typical deliberations this argu-
ment may have been sufficient to justify a decision to prefer this position. But since
the case at hand is a legal case before a court, Judge McCarthy went further by also
providing an argument to support his legal authority to choose this solution, based on a
principal of equitable division. Three arguments were put forward as backing for this
equitable division principal: 1) an argument from authority, citing a law review article
by Professor Helmolz which proposed applying the principal of equitable division to
resolve disputes between finders of lost property, 2) an argument from legal tradition,
pointing out that the principal of equitable division has its roots in ancient Roman law,
and 3) by citing two precedent cases in which the principal of equitable division had
been applied.
Three of the four arguments pro and con the alternative positions in Judge Mc-
Carthy’s deliberation about how to find an equitable solution are arguments from prac-
tical reasoning. But to see this clearly it would be necessary to reveal some premises
which have been left implicit, for lack of room in the diagram. For example, in the
argument against giving Popov the ball, the major premise is missing. This premise
would state that giving one person exclusive rights to personal property when some-
one else has an equally good claim to the property would undermine, not promote,
the value of equity. Similarly, in the argument pro dividing the property equally, the
major premise, stating that dividing property equally among persons with equally good
claims to the property promotes the value of equity, is missing. But as evidenced by the
legal argument about the authority of a judge to divide property in such cases, clearly
not all arguments in a deliberation need be arguments from practical reasoning.
This completes our model in Carneades of Popov v Hayashi. The model includes
33 arguments, using the following argumentation schemes:
• 1 Argument from witness testimony (for 17 witnesses)
• 1 Argument from circumstantial evidence (for the video)
• 13 Arguments from legal rules (not statutes, which are one way to back rules,
but for all rules, whatever their backing)
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• 1 Argument from legal principle (equitable division)
• 5 Arguments from secondary authority (professors, treatises, etc.)
• 2 Arguments from precedent cases (including arguments from an analysis of a
line of cases, not just citations to particular cases)
• 4 Arguments from practical reasoning
• 3 Arguments from positions (i.e. proposed solutions to problems, as in IBIS)
• 1 Argument from tradition (Roman law)
• 2 ad hoc arguments (the first undermining the video evidence by arguing the
video didn’t show the ball was secured and the second arguing that Popov’s right
to possession encumbered Hayashi’s interest in the ball)
To conclude this section on our model of Popov v Hayashi, let us now try to use
the model to evaluate and criticize Judge McCarthy’s opinion. First of all, Judge Mc-
Carthy seems to have done a good job of justifying his decision. His arguments are
seamless. Both his rejection of Popov’s two claims, for conversion and trespass to
chattel, and his decision to have the ball sold and the proceeds divided, are justified,
at least formally, by the arguments in the opinion. Nonetheless, our reconstruction of
his arguments in Carneades has helped us to reveal some weaknesses in the opinion.
For example, in Judge McCarthy’s presentation of his analysis of the testimonial evi-
dence of the 17 witnesses, he provides an aggregated summary of his analysis, without
making explicit which critical questions, such as bias, were applied to undermine the
testimony of each witness separately. This makes it impossible for the reader to form
his own opinion about the testimony of each witness. Perhaps this information can be
recovered from the transcript of the trial. But probably the major weakness of Judge
McCarthy’s opinion is the rather uncritical way he applied the argumentation scheme
for practical reasoning. Since he applied this scheme himself, when writing his opin-
ion, there was no respondent to challenge these arguments by asking critical questions
of the scheme for practical reasoning. Here are some possible critical questions of the
scheme for practical reasoning [Walton, 2006, p. 330]:
1. Are there alternative means to achieve the goal?
2. Is the goal realistic?
3. Are there other goals which might conflict with the stated goal?
4. Would the proposed solution have any negative consequences (side effects) which
should be considered?
5. Is the proposed solution the best or most acceptable alternative?
While Judge McCarthy did consider three alternative proposals for achieving an
equitable result in this case, he did not consider, at least in his written opinion, potential
negative side effects or conflicting goals or values, other than equity. If the decision
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had been appealed, presumably the appellate judges would have take the opportunity
to consider such questions.
From a legal perspective, it also seems somewhat surprising how little use Judge
McCarthy made of primary legal sources (statutes and cases) and, conversely, how
extensively he relied upon secondary sources, such as Witkin’s Summary of California
law and the legal opinions of various professors. Even the legal analysis of the animal
cases was delegated to some of these professors, which is why the argument from these
cases was classified above as an argument from secondary authority, rather than as an
argument from precedent.
3 Discussion
Thus far in this paper we have demonstrated how Carneades can support the tasks
of reconstructing and evaluating arguments, using Judge McCarthy’s opinion of the
Popov v Hayashi case as an example. In this final section of the paper, we would like
to critically evaluate Carneades itself, and ask ourselves how much support it really
provides for this task, compared to some other available tools and methods.
First of all, let us emphasize that the Carneades software was in fact used for the
analysis of the Popov v Hayashi case presented here. All of the figures are from
screen shots of the software.9 Could we have achieved the same result without us-
ing Carneades? Yes, surely. For example, we could have applied Walton’s method-
ology manually, without the support of any software tools. But we needn’t be that
ascetic. There is much generic software, with no special support for argumentation,
which could be useful in this context, starting with text editors and drawing tools.
More useful still would be outline processors, and mind-mapping tools, but these are
typically limited to modeling trees, not more general graphs. Argument graphs, in gen-
eral, are not limited to trees. But this limitation can be overcome by simply duplicating
some nodes in the tree.
For some reason, mindmaps have not been often used, to our knowledge, for mod-
eling arguments. Most people seem to prefer “box and arrow” diagrams in the Beards-
ley/Freeman style [Beardsley, 1950, Freeman, 1991]. Carneades diagrams are similar,
although there are some important differences. For example, in Carneades diagrams
there is only a single node for each proposition and its logical complement. In the
Beardsley/Freeman style of diagramming, the statement and its complement are rep-
resented as two nodes, connected with a “refutation” link. Also, there are no con
arguments in the Beardsley/Freeman style. Rather con arguments are represented as
arguments pro the refutation of the conclusion.
Araucaria is probably the most well known open source software application to
support argument reconstruction via argument diagramming [Reed and Rowe, 2004].10
Araucaria currently provides more support than Carneades for argumentation schemes,
but we are working on overcoming this disadvantage. Carneades does provide a way
9The screen shots have been edited slightly to overcome the lack of color printing, by adding check marks
and Xs to accepted and rejected statements, respectively.
10http://www.computing.dundee.ac.uk/staff/creed/araucaria/
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to enter the name of the argumentation scheme applied for each argument in the dia-
gram, but Araucaria goes further by providing a way to match the premises of a scheme
against the premises of an argument, which is very useful for helping to reveal miss-
ing or incorrect premises. On the other hand, Araucaria, unlike Carneades, does not
currently provide support for automatically labeling arguments or statements using a
formal model of argument. Araucaria can be used to manually label statements, but it
is completely the user’s responsibility to do this in some coherent way.
When we claim that Carneades supports argument reconstruction, we mean only
that it, like Araucaria, provides software for modeling and visualizing arguments and
relationships between arguments. Such tools are useful for representing and comparing
interpretations of natural language texts. Current research in the field of computational
linguistics may eventually lead to tools which can provide additional support for argu-
ment reconstruction [Mochales and Leven, 2009].
As demonstrated in our reconstruction of Judge McCarthy’s deliberations about
how to decide Popov v Hayashi in an equitable way, Carneades can be used to con-
struct IBIS diagrams. Probably the leading open source IBIS tool at the moment is
Compendium [Selvin et al., 2001].11 Whereas Compendium is a robust, mature and
well-documented tool, Carneades is still a research prototype, in an early stage of de-
velopment. But Compendium, like Araucaria, lacks a formal foundation enabling the
software to provide support comparable to Carneades for argument evaluation.
There are many other argument mapping tools available, including some commer-
cial ones, but this is not the place for a comprehensive market overview. Let us just
say that, to our knowledge, few of them provide support for argument evaluation com-
parable to Carneades. Some exceptions include Hermes [Karacapilidis and Papadias,
2001], which is based on Zeno [Gordon and Karacapilidis, 1997], ArguMed [Verheij,
2005] and, most recently, Dungine [South et al., 2008], which visualizes abstract ar-
gumentation frameworks [Dung, 1995]. But precisely because abstract argumentation
frameworks are abstract, Dungine provides no way to represent the premises and con-
clusions of arguments or to visualize how premises and conclusions of arguments are
connected or related.
A very interesting recent web-based system for argument visualization is ArguNet12
In ArguNet, argument graphs are diagrammed in a compact way at a higher level of
abstraction, comparable in some ways to Dung abstract argumentation frameworks,
while still providing a way to represent the micro-structure of arguments. ArguNet is
based on classical logic and does not, to our knowledge, provide support for defeasi-
ble argumentation or proof standards, unlike Carneades, as needed for modeling legal
arguments.
As in Araucaria, Carneades’ support for assigning argumentation schemes to ar-
guments is useful for evaluating arguments, even after they have been reconstructed,
modeled and visualized. Argumentation schemes make it possible to identify implicit
premises in an argument and ask the corresponding critical questions.
The arguments in Judge McCarthy’s opinion of Popov v Hayashi were modeled at
least once previously, prior to the articles in this volume [Wyner et al., 2007]. This
11http://compendium.open.ac.uk/institute/index.htm
12http://www.argunet.org/debates/. See also [Betz, 2009].
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reconstruction was based primarily on their prior work on valued-based argumenta-
tion systems [Bench-Capon, 2003] and modeling practical reasoning [Atkinson et al.,
2004], but it did make use of several argumentation schemes, in addition to the scheme
for practical reasoning, including arguments from witness testimony and defeasible
modus ponens. However the arguments from argumentation schemes for reasoning
about evidence, such as witness testimony, were not modeled. Rather, the paper only
describes how such schemes are used to reason about evidence and presents the re-
sults of this manual analysis as a list of facts. The analysis of the legal arguments
proceeds by first modeling a set of defeasible rules which allow intermediate conclu-
sions to be derived from the facts and then using these rules to construct the arguments
in the opinion. Finally, the arguments are evaluated by asserting attack relations be-
tween these arguments to construct a Dung abstract argumentation framework. The
attack relations have been derived from a formal model of relationships between argu-
ments constructed from rules. The final part of Judge McCarthy’s opinion, where he
deliberates about how to reach an equitable decision, is modeled using a value-based
argumentation framework. However, while this model clarifies why it would not be
justified to award the ball to either Popov or Hayashi, it does not, unlike our recon-
struction in Carneades here, cover Judge McCarthy’s justification for selling the ball
and dividing the proceeds equally between the parties. Moreover, their reconstruction
was done manually, with no support from a software tool for their formal methods.
To conclude, we have illustrated Carneades’ support for argument reconstruction,
evaluation and visualization, by modeling most of the factual and legal arguments in
Popov v Hayashi, and compared Carneades to prior related work on argumentation
tools and methods. But this article has not presented a comprehensive overview of the
Carneades system. In addition to argument reconstruction, evaluation and visualiza-
tion, Carneades also provides support for other use cases shown in Figure 1, especially
argument construction from knowledge bases consisting of models of ontologies, rules
and cases, using formal models of several argumentation schemes, interpreted as meth-
ods for constructing arguments [Gordon and Walton, 2009]. To use a knowledge base
to generate arguments automatically, the knowledge of the domain would need to be
modeled at a finer level of granularity than we have used here. This will often not be
practically feasible, due to the so-called “knowledge acquisition bottleneck”. When
this is not feasible, Carneades can still be used as a tool for constructing arguments,
as a more advanced kind of outliner, mind mapper or idea processor, with particular
support for argumentation. In the legal field, there is a new generation of commer-
cial case-management tools on the way, which are designed to assist lawyers with the
task of constructing and evaluating arguments.13 One can imagine that in the future
judges will use tools like Carneades to draft their opinions in the first place, not just to
reconstruct arguments, after the fact, as we have tried to do here.
13In Germany, for example, see KnowledgeTools (http://www.knowledgetools.de), FallSoft
(http://www.fallsoft.de/) and Normfall (http://www.normfall.de/).
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